Objectively True

When I first read the opening from Hobbes’ Leviathan as an undergraduate, I laughed.  I laughed heartily.   There was something clearly, and quaintly, absurd about his simple (though perhaps vaguely Rube-Goldberg-esque) chain of mechanistic causal events which for him became the workings of the universe.  From Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 1: Of Sense:

The cause of Sense, is the Externall Body, or Object, which
presseth the organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly,
as in the Tast and Touch; or mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing,
and Smelling: which pressure, by the mediation of Nerves, and other
strings, and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the Brain,
and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or counter-pressure,
or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which endeavour
because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without.  And this Seeming,
or Fancy, is that which men call sense; and consisteth, as to the Eye,
in a Light, or Colour Figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill,
in an Odour; To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour; and to the rest
of the body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities,
as we discern by Feeling.  All which qualities called Sensible,
are in the object that causeth them, but so many several motions
of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversly.  Neither in
us that are pressed, are they anything els, but divers motions;
(for motion, produceth nothing but motion.)  But their apparence to
us is Fancy, the same waking, that dreaming.  And as pressing, rubbing,
or striking the Eye, makes us fancy a light; and pressing the Eare,
produceth a dinne; so do the bodies also we see, or hear, produce
the same by their strong, though unobserved action

The absurdity, to me, was not merely that Hobbes thought that he had figured out the mechanisms that ruled over our senses and feelings simply by expanding simple principles of interaction of bodies.  Rather, I laughed because I thought it was preposterous that Hobbes thought to account for non-physical things, like emotions and mental activity, by means of materialist mumbo-jumbo.

Leviathan, cover from wikimedia.org

Curiously, I was simultaneously quite sincerely open to, if not entirely credulous of, the findings of modern psychological studies which played the exact same role–namely, making the naturalist presumption that those things which seem incorporeal (like thoughts, sensory data, and emotions) could be studied as causes of simple physical interactions observable, for instance, by means tools like nMRI.  Modern naturalist science (I’m convinced that naturalism is not in any way definitional of science, but rather a mere ubiquitous presumption of modern scientists and the in-vogue scientific paradigms) simply has a more complex version of Hobbes’ materialism.  Rather than simply positing that something “preseth on the eye”, biologists a conception of our senses as the products of a complex of chemical and physical interactions which can all be reduced, theoretically, to a naturalistic incarnation of particle physics.

Each of these two perspectives–Hobbesian materialism and modern naturalist science–has issues with the classical Cartesian mind/body dualism.  What I considered incredible in the Hobbesian perspective, I should recall, is not the given dualism ” between two sorts of ’stuff’, material and immaterial” (as Rorty calls it), but was once an idea marked more by its novelty than its broad acceptance.  With what reasons did dualism replace materialism as the dominant metaphysical structural assumption?  Certainly a number of enticing dualist metaphysical systems exist, and we might have good reason/s–logical or practical–to accept any of these.  I am not convinced that this dualism is essentially reasonable (or for that matter, if it is, that it is reasonable that we should assume that the non-material side of this dualism should have laws similar to our empirically-derived laws for the natural world); I am likewise not convinced that the material dualism has any cogent appeal over metaphysical tri-ism, quad-ism, or infinit-isms (do metaphysicians have terms for these?), other than theoretical parsimony.

Rorty speaketh

Richard Rorty opens Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Chapter 1 with this to say about dualism:

Discussions in the philosophy of mind usually start off by assuming that everybody has always known how to divide the world into the mental and the physical–that this distinction is common-sensical and intuitive, even if that between two sorts of “stuff”, material and immaterial, is  philosophical and baffling”

While I don’t think that this position is completely fair or accurate, Rorty’s point is well-made.  If we need a dozen or more metaphysical systems for bridging that “between” in the mind/body dualism–epiphenominalism, parallelism, occasionalism, and their ilk–and the whole dualist project is so difficult for us to fine-tune, what makes this dualism seem so obvious?  I suspect Rorty is not just being eristic when he implies that its our dogmatic entrenchment which makes this dualism seem natural, not some objectively-apparent metaphysical substructure.  This dogmatic entrenchment, I think, is what made Hobbes’ materialist metaphysics seem so quaint and rediculous; meanwhile, my dogmatic entrenchment in the authority of modern scientific findings allowed me to provisionally accept a sort of materialist perspective.  Perhaps it is unfair of me to so readily accept one while simultaneously poo-poo-ing the other.

I enjoy Rorty’s criticism of this dualism, but I think my position is still largely gauche to his.  We should not ignore the predominant metaphysical assumption of dualism–nor, conversely, the metaphysical (or physical) presumption of monism/materialism (or other metaphysical -isms).  We simply ought to be aware of, but not necessarily strictly opposed to, our dogmatic assumptions.  Likewise, we should take note when our various presumptions do not jibe well.  Do we assume dualism, yet affirm the findings of research that presumes or requires monism?  If so, is it merely the result of the brute cultural force of one over the other, or are there good reasons for believing both?  Certainly we might simply mean “monism” and “dualism” in different ways.  Dualisms, of course, may be distinctions between “subtances”, “properties”, or “predicates”, among other things; or perhaps it is fair of us to utilize dualist assumptions in a monist reality or monist assumptions in a dualist reality, if they get us the practical results we desire in some parsimonious way in some areas.  In the same way that we still utilize Newton’s laws for some gravity calculations, despite the existence of more precise post-Einstein calculations, it may simply be the best to use one or the other as a tool.  By this point you surely have figured out that this is my pragmatic proposition for an approach to metaphysics; It is my belief that a “dualism assumption awareness” campaign is much more likely to give us the results we desire than a “dualist-smashing” campaign which it seems to me Rorty is using to get us to agree to presume materialism for pragmatic purposes (corrections/comments greatly appreciated!).

Having now crossed the introductory threshold into Rorty’s work, a few general notions have struck me.  The first is that it seems to me that Rorty, despite having a varied set of philosophical positions as a youth (assuming his autobiography is correct) and during his early philosophical career, held a remarkably stable philosophical position from the writing of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature through the end of his life.  Waggish thinks that you can sort Rorty’s positions into three categories: analytic, decontsructionist, and liberal populist (see Richard Rorty, 1931-2007).  So far, I disagree.  Yes, there are thematic differences in Rorty’s works.  It may also be true that pre-Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature-Rorty is a code-cracking (as Rorty calls himself) analytic philosopher with little to foreshadow his later anti-foundationalism aside from a caustic devil-may-care style of criticism.

However, Rorty’s topical differences, which even Waggish says exist simultaneously, hardly come off as differences in philosophical perspective.  If Rorty, who at this point in the work is wearing his goals and influences on his sleeve, is being honest about where this book is going and how it is getting there, the only foreseeable potential for change from 1979 to 2000 would be mere nuance.  Of course, this conclusion is both tentative and flippant, based on a few pages from a handful of varied books written decades apart.

Summary

To return to the content of the introduction itself, Rorty begins with a small gift–a brickbat for modern philosophy.  Philosophers since Kant, he claims, like to think of themselves as having access to the timeless problems and the timeless answers (or search for answers) that serve as the basis for all other human knowledge (and, I suspect he would be willing to agree, founds not only metaphysics/epistemology, but also ethics and now “meaning” as well).  We owe this foundationalism/arrogance, he states matter-of-factly, to John Locke’s ” ‘theory of knowledge’ based on an understanding of ‘mental processes’ ” as well as to Descartes’ conception of “the mind” as a distinct, process-like intangible.  From that point, the role of philosophy was developed into a “tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rust of culture” with the assumption that philosophers had access to foundational mind/process upon which all of the rest of human knowledge is contingent.  Most of the grunt work here was done by Kant, but the job was not finished until neo-Kantians so embedded this foundationalism that ” ‘philosophy’ became, for the intellectuals, a substitute for religion.”

Many philosophers undermined this position.  Many, like William James and Nietzsche, were simply ignored or marginalized.  Eventually, though, criticisms became too great, and the works of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey, for instance, have helped erode the authority and faith in philosophical foundationalism.  While many–notably Husserl and Russell–have attempted to re-foundationalize philosophy, Rorty seems to think that philosophy is ineluctably bound to be demoted from its position as high-meta-priest of knowledge and culture, certainly with his help.

Rorty promises to try to convince his readers not to think of philosophy as a means of obtaining objective truth (a mirror of nature); we ought to ditch our Greek/Cartesian dualisms, embrace a mildly Kuhnian historicism and a Deweyian conception of truth, and move on.

Discussion

So, are Rorty’s charges of philosophical foundational arrogance fair?  Anecdotally, I have found many of the philosophers whom I have met to be among the most humble, despite being among the most intelligent, of people with whom I have associated in general.  As a student of philosophy, I suspect that I’m prone to awarding philosophy that arrogant prize that Rorty wants to take away–the claim to holding, if not the answers that provide universal foundational knowledge, the meaningful questions that humans desire, or should desire, to ask.

If this is all that Rorty is getting at, his assessment seems somewhat fair.  I would add, however, that in modernity philosophy is not the only field which makes claims of this sort.  Religion, and theological studies, often make claims or seek objective meaning, objective ends, foundational understanding of truth, a method of prioritizing which places religion or religious belief or religious ethics or religious questions at the foundation of human existence.  Psychology, likewise, has claims to begin at the foundation of knowledge, the human mind itself.  Do not biology and biochemistry seek the same foundational understanding?  Don’t astronomers look for clues which they hope would give us foundational understanding of life and meaning?  Would not particle physicists claim that all these other pursuits are dependent upon their foundational knowledge?  Even in the humanities and social sciences–sociology, rhetoric, anthropology, history–it seems to me that some incarnation of claims to foundational access to knowledge, meaning, or importance are made.  Perhaps few or none of these claims have the same sort of epistemic or metaphysical bent to them, but I reckon that each is guilty of its claims to arrogance in its own way–perhaps moreso the product of the values of those entering these fields than by virtue of the unified claims of the field in general.

However, if perhaps only for historical and cultural reasons, the field of philosophy may be just a bit more chauvinistic than other areas of study.  Certainly after having been the apex of renaissance humanism’s educational hierarchy, after having been Boethius’s consolation, and having been the salient intellectual perspective enduring since the supposed Greco-Roman founding of Western Civilization, Philosophy may yet have a little humility due it.  Rorty thinks philosophers might need to quit calling their questions and answers eternal; we should recognize that philosophy as time and culture bound as the hard sciences.  Yale’s Anthony T. Kronman argues, in Education’s End (sold here), that philosophy and the rest of the so-called humanities are simply the last fields of study to be brought under the research ideal; perhaps an eventual full incorporation into this ideal (which neither I nor Kronman support) would give philosophy that historicist humility which has so far escaped so many philosophers still seeking to write that “last book”.

The “Cash Value” of my reading

I certainly think that Rorty’s criticisms are worth bearing in mind.  Perhaps I am guilty of being too-far embedded in the goals, practice, and culture of philosophy, but I think it is better that we meet Rorty only half way.  His historicist and antifoundationalist positions ought to be recognized and ought to strongly discourage us from believing in the permanence of any philosophical questions and/or answers.  However, I do not think that this means we should not still attempt or cannot ever achieve the kind of permanence or foundationalism that Rorty rails against.  While philosophy may seem old, I argue that is quite young.  Even if you claim that what we today call philosophy is the same animal that arose in Ancient Greece; or perhaps when Gilgamesh first contemplates his mortality; or perhaps the first time the first person “desired to know”, humans are a young species on a young planet with heck of a lot of learning yet to do.  Writing off foundationalism at this youthful stage of our development is, if nothing else, closing a giant door to inquiry.  Yes, Rorty, philosophers do not seem anywhere close to coming up with foundational answers, but leave us, please, our foundational questions and let us cavil a bit about them just in case.

image courtesy of princeton press; apparently only aesthetic philosophers get pretty covers

In my attempt to learn a bit more from some “post”-analyitic philosophers, I’ve decided to begin by revisiting Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (sold here).  I rather regret going back to this text before having had direct experience with the work of Heidegger in particular, but I am also displeased that I have yet to read any substantial works from Wilfrid Sellars, David Donaldson, Rudolph Carnap and W.V.O. Quine.  However, I suspect that I will be aided by the fact that I have ventured at least gotten my feet wet in exploring John Dewey, Hans Gadamer, Richard J. Bernstein, Quine, and Wittgenstein since i first rushed through parts of Rorty’s work two years ago.

I have chosen to start with Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature for a number of reasons.  First, it seems to me something of a seminal work–for Rorty, for philosophy internally, and about philosophy from an external perspective.  Rorty’s criticisms are, if I remember well and if my sources are accurate, poignant, reflective, but not pleasing to the ears of most philosophers.  As such, he cannot be ignored.  Either Rorty’s harsh words are valid and philosophy must reform itself in some dramatic ways or philosophers must make a cogent rejoinder.  Since the writing of Rorty’s book, I suspect both have been done with countless subtle incarnations of each, and perhaps some not so subtle.

I have also selected this work for pragmatic reasons, because I think it represents a noteworthy pastiche of early Neopragmatist/postanalytic philosophers’ works (namely Quine, Sellars, and Davidson), as well as those of some of their influences (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and to some extent Dewey).  Furthermore, there is a marked lack of analytic tradition philosopherss in my formal education in philosophy–a deficiency which I hope to allay at least to some degree by reading this work.  Finally, I have selected Rorty’s text over those of his peers because the philosophical exploration that I have just begun was encouraged by epistemological criticisms of Rorty’s later work–work which is foreshadowed very strongly in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.

(If you came from facebook, click on the “view original post” link to see animations and formatting, the article’s much prettier that way.  If you were invited, it’s because I thought you might enjoy a little joyful reminder of the pragmatism you once studied.  peace.)

No doubt that one of the most salient sources of the flak that philosophers receive from others is that they are willing to engage in serious discussion about otherwise seemingly worthless minutiae–apparently that includes pragmatists, too.  However, when I happened again upon this piece by William James, I simply could not keep myself from asking a few hair-splitting questions.

From William James What Pragmatism Means: Lecture II [1909]

Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I returned from a solitary ramble to find every one engaged in a ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a squirrel – a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a tree-trunk; while over against the tree’s opposite side a human being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction, and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now is this: Does the man go round the squirrel or not? He goes round the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness, discussion had been worn threadbare. Every one had taken sides, and was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Each side, when I appeared therefore appealed to me to make it a majority. Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and found one, as follows: “Which party is right,” I said, “depends on what you practically mean by ‘going round’ the squirrel. If you mean passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther dispute. You are both right and both wrong according as you conceive the verb ‘to go round’ in one practical fashion or the other.”

While I appreciate James’ attempt to illustrate pragmatism by example in this case, I think this is a great opportunity to nitpick a bit, hopefully to better elucidate the meaning and uses of pragmatism.

I have a few outstanding criticisms of James’ use of this story above.  First, I am not confident that when James says “depends on what you practically mean by ‘going round’ the squirrel” [emphasis mine], that the word practically brings any additional meaning its sentence, given the assumption that the rest of James’ paragraph is the explanation of what might be meant practically.  In other words, James might just as well have said that it “depends on what you mean by ‘going round’ the squirrel”, because there is no difference in meaning between the two sentences.  When William James goes on to describe the two potential definitions for “going round”, he supplies definitions which do not really touch on the pragmatic nature of the situation.  Each definition is, it seems to me*, metaphysical–as is the question of going round the squirrel (*for the sake of simplicity, I’m proposing a metaphysical v. pragmatic dichotomy here, let’s not bring language/psychology/etc. into the equation).

This is not to say, however, that a pragmatic distinction cannot be made for this metaphysical squirrel question.  Indeed, it seems to me that a clarification drawn between what our squirrel-watching friends “mean” and what they “practically mean” might help us get a better grasp on pragmatism, if we can simply get away from the positions James offers us.

I will begin by examining James’ two potential definitions for “going round” the squirrel.

“Going Round”

First, James says one approach is to claim that going round said squirrel means “being first in front of him, then on the right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in front again”.  My complaint with this description is that it does not satisfy what we expect when we say “going round”; to illustrate this, I’ve composed a little animation (go easy on me, it’s my first attempt ever) which shows a man–William James himself, actually– “going round a squirrel” by this definition:

apposite version of James going round a squirrel

I suspect most people will agree that this does not really illustrate what we mean when we say “going round”; therefore, James’ apposite approach to defining the motion is unsuccessful.  I should say that there are other options for satisfying the conditions of this apposite definition, but they are more difficult to animate.

Now on to the directional approach to defining “going round”.  I have made another animation in a like manner to illustrate a scenario that falls within the bounds of James description “passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then to the west, and then to the north of him again”:

directional version of James going round a squirrel

Again, I think most of us will agree that this is not what is meant by going round, and, again, this is only one animation of a number of possible configurations.

So…what’s the point?

My intent, here, was not merely to disapprove of William James’ options for defining a man going round a squirrel.  Rather, it is to question whether merely defining things in simple relations to each other–and abstracted from the reality of motives and consequences–presents us with metaphysical answers, not pragmatic answers (pragmatic in both the sense of philosophy and of practical use).

My alternative approach, and one which seems to me more indicative of the goals of pragmatism (please correct me if I am wrong), is that the definition of “going round” can be precise, but it must be fluid depending on our ends, our experiences and knowledge, and the prospective consequences of the ends and knowledge which we bring to the table.  I’ll attempt to make this clearer with a quick and dirty example.

A truly pragmatic distinction in meaning requires application.  In this sense, we might need not only to “go round the squirrel”, but to “go round the squirrel for [some reason] “.  For example, if I ask you to go round the squirrel to get a full-view 3D picture for mapping into a computer, and you keep chasing the squirrel around with the camera, but can only ever get the little beast to show its belly to you, then you might rightly tell me “I simply could not get round the squirrel to get those pictures”.  Yet if your task was merely to go round the squirrel to set up pylon cameras to get those same images, you might rightly explain to me that you were able to go round the squirrel in order to complete this task, though in this case you never beheld the rodent’s dorsal side.  In these cases, the definition is formed through the situation and its consequences; there appears to be a real cash value (on the converse, what does James’ situational and definitional distinction get for us?  Perhaps we receive nothing, if we have no interest vested in either consequence).

Perhaps, then, the difference between what we mean and practically mean might not be a difference in denotation.  What I mean by going round the squirrel might be confined to a simple definition, but what I practically mean in the given example is that the act of “going round the squirrel” is an act the whose completion belongs to the category of things required in order for me to accomplish my end goal, one of the things which would get me closer to obtaining the cash-value of the 3D computer image of said squirrel.

So much for getting back into the habit of “blogging”.  So much, also, for the promises of new reviews, thoughts, comments, and readings.  I have not, of late, had quite the slew of time for which I had hoped, and that which I have been afforded was spent in ways previously unanticipated.  What I have accomplished thought, is some work on a new piece of “software”–a little mysql/php-based teaching application, inspired by the illustrious pauker, and based loosely on the same Leitner cardfile method, but more adapted to my needs as a student more readily prone to a Deweyian process of education than the tedium of memorization.

In other news, I have actually begun my reviews of the Dead Science album and Appiah’s book, but both are incomplete.  My venture into Simon Critchley’s Infinitely Demanding has also begun, but I may set it aside now that I have acquired a few new postanalytical philosophy works.  Critchley was not uninformative.  Though the first 20 pages or so of his work it seemed to me held nothing particularly cogent except that which was a mere reformulation of Levinas, it seemed to simply be an attempt to come to terms in order to make a clearer point later in the work, and I will be eager to later resume my reading of Infinitely Demanding.  However, I have an alluring idea for a sustained study of postanalytic philosophy.  If this study bears any fruit, I will describe it later.

I’ve decided that a couple of things that I’ve recently read and heard deserve a good review.  I eventually hope to put up somewhat in-depth reviews of Anthony T. Kronman’s book Education’s End, an actual review of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics, and The Dead Science’s latest album Villainaire.  If I get enough time (not likely) I’d like to eventually compose some reviews for a few other records and readings that I completed this summer, particularly the readings on Eastern religions, terrorism, a few things from Richard Rorty, Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  If, for some strange, new, and unforseen reason, I am allowed any time aside from my studies, I would also be eager to put up a few mentions that I have on some recently discovered films and albums, of which Jean-Luc Godard’s Alphaville and recordings from The Azusa Plane and Randy Grief come immediately to mind.

While I am at it, I might start posting a few random things on the progression of my thoughts and ideas in general, as that was one of the original bases for my posting here.

I am going to attempt to read from a little collection of Quine papers, and I shall hopefully soon make some headway in the Simon Critchley book, Infinitely Demanding, on which I just got my hands.

peace.

I’ve finished preparing my “summary” of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics.  I ended up deviating a bit too much to call my work a real summary, but I think many of the points will make for useful discussion.  A lot of material has been intentionally left out, particularly after the situational examples illustrated, because I would like to see how the existing points play out in discussion. My article can be found here, and there is room for discussion of the article or topic in general here, if you feel so inclined.

I’ve begun constructing a brief summary of Kwame Anthony Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics for next week’s philosophy club meeting.  I intend to focus on three main concepts, beginning with the assumption of virtue ethics, moving through the challenges of situationist ethics, and ultimately applying a hybrid of those two concerns to the situations provided by the book.  I intend to include a bit of my own interpretations and examples.  It is clear that Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics have a great relevance here, but I am looking for a bit more information on the  psychological side of things, perhaps I’ll see if William James had something to contribute here.

Please forgive my first ever attempt at a book review; this review is for Steve Long’s The Climbing Handbook [Firefly Books, 2007].

As a disclaimer to this review, I ought to mention that Steve Long’s book is the first I’ve read on the subject of rock climbing, and I am an extremely callow climber. That said, my general inexperience as in the subject might be helpful for others interested in gaining introductory insights into climbing, and my review might also elucidate whether this book is too elementary for more experienced climbers.

The book has an ambitious, remarkably broad set range of topics discussed–including history of the sport, genre divisions in rock climbing, safety techniques, travel and climbing-site specific information, tips on picking out equipment, instructions on climbing maneauvers, tips on diet and exercise, notes on competitions, and much more. Considering both the eagerness of the project and the slightly-larger-than-pocket size of the text, it should not be unexpected that while the general topic of climbing is discussed in a very complete fashion, some specific individual topics are exceptionally abbreviated discussions.

Overall, the book seems inclusive, outlining most of the climbing approaches and equipment which i would have anticipated or hoped for, plus a few which i did not. The book is chock-full of illustrations, diagrams, photographs, and the like, which to me seem an absolute necessity for any adequate hands-off presentation of climbing technique. There were a few places in the text where perhaps a superfluous (but often aesthetically inviting) photo of a glorious rock face with an attached climber or a diagram for an exceedingly simple technique or a redundant tip bubble might have been omitted in order that the abridged description of a procedure might be made more clear. However, in general these tended to add clarity to my novice understanding of materials, procedures, setup, safety, knots, equipment, and the like.

There were two sections which I felt were particularly well-constructed–namely “essential safety skills” and “key techniques”. Each seemed helpful, descriptive, comprehensive, and–with several notable exceptions–left me with relatively few unanswered questions compared to many of the other sections. Thankfully, these two sections seemed to make up the real meat of the books, such that the best information was available from the largest and most interesting portions of the work. To me, the simplest of diagrams and photographs–those intending to portray only one idea, technique, or feature–were by far the most helpful. Grip techniques were very clear, as well as most of the vital diagrams describing safe anchoring techniques for cams, webbing, rope, pitons, and the like. I found some diagrams attempting to explain, for example, rope techniques which became confusing by attempting to illustrate full sequences of connections in a diagram without proper correlating explanations.

The most salient pitfalls of the text are with overall clarity and organization. Most notably, I think that readers as green or greener than myself might experience some difficulty with climbing techniques or terms not being properly described before they are used in the book. Some very basic terms in climbing have quite different jargoned meanings from their status quo definitions, and many of these–protection, jug, second, natural, and psych come to mind immediately–are defined much later than they are first used (and in some cases, never defined at all, even in the glossary). Perhaps the guide is not intended for those of us too callow to recognize these terms or techniques, but if this is the case, then it is a mistake for the work to define them–as it often does–later on. Prusik, for example, is used multiple times at the beginning of the book, but is not defined in the glossary and not explained in the book until page 48. Likewise, jug is needed to understand a suggested exercise on page 91, but is not defined until page 94. Psyching is used on page 82, but explained on 85. Conversely, sometimes terms or procedures are defined redundantly; the munter hitch, for example, is described in nearly the same words on both pages 53 and 64. Additionally, some portions simply seem out-of-place. Rigging a repel, ascending and descending, and constructing a prusik are relegated to the back of the book, away from the other sections on other related in-climb techniques. Sometimes a bit more information might have been provided, such as diagrams (page 57 could have used one concerning threads) or simply further description (page 53 mentions some configurations being “weak” for equipment, but does not describe them). I thought that the sections on techniques and safety skills might have benefited from the addition of a brief section consolidating and describing the fundamental ideas of loading, directionality, and force.

These weak points should not entirely overshadow the benefits of the book, however. By the end of the work, many of the questions and problems and confusions that were left by individual sections were largely answered. Unfortunately, this was often only after they were mentioned elsewhere in the book, such that a full understanding of equipment and procedure might require two readings for some novices. In general, instruction is succinct and clear, and the information is relevant. True, the book could use enough editing to warrant a second edition, but it is certainly an excellent source of information in its current form.

In the spirit of attempting to move the first selections of impediment into what I pray is my once-and-for-all internet home (after having hosted my content on slyink, blogger, wordpress, and many other web pages), I wish to commence posting on this new journal with a statement of current purpose*.

My intention is to utilize this online journal as a record of my thoughts in and over time, such that I might finally have an organized collection of salient notions which cross my mind–rather than relying on scraps of paper, random notebooks, files on different drives of different computers, and so on.  An added benefit to this method of organization is that I also may gain an improved understanding of precisely how my thoughts change over time and what sources have tended to consciously influence my thoughts.  The upsides of this which immediately strike me are that I might be able to more coherently explain my ideas and influences, that I might become more aware of my biases as they develop (and hopefully by extension become better able to constructively criticize my thoughts or to respond to constructive criticism), and that I might also be able to more knowledgeably advise or teach others struggling with problems relevant to my past thoughts or readings.  I intend, therefore, to publish my notes, thoughts, and opinions in some regular fashion–but the content itself may seem anything but regular.

I hope also, but do not expect or anticipate, to receive feedback.  Thoughts, corrections, comments, complaints, praise, concerns, or questions are heartily encouraged.

* While I hardly anticipate that the popularity of this one-among-billions-of-blogs shall incur the attention of many, in the rather obscure likelihood that this blog might ever receive any attention, the first post bears a particular statistical likelihood of also being viewed as a compliment to any other post onto which a reader may stumble.